This paper addresses questions related to the cost of China's bank restructuring and financing. We first propose a framework for recognizing losses. Then, we examine the recent major moves by the Chinese government to repair the country's bank balance sheets. Finally, we explore the implications of the Chinese ways of funding the bank restructuring. We find that the Chinese government has been decisive in confronting the costly task of bank restructuring. Looking through the elaborate funding arrangements adopted so far, the Chinese taxpayers have paid most of the bill.
Introduction
International experience suggests that bank restructuring, including resolution of nonperforming loans (NPLs) and the associated recapitalization of banks, is often costlybut crucial for the stability and efªcient functioning of banking systems.
1 While effectively stemming the ºow of new NPLs is necessary for sustained improvement in the banking system, the importance of dealing with the stock of legacy NPLs still on the bank books or within the system should not be understated: in no small measure, it may reveal the political willingness of authorities to confront domestic banking problems. Moreover, NPL resolution is often inextricably linked with bank recapitalization. Therefore, the questions of how bank restructuring should be ªnanced and how the associated potential loss should be allocated among parties involved must not be swept under the rug.
China's bank restructuring bill may eventually approach 30 percent of GDP. Losses of this magnitude should not be surprising, given that NPLs are believed to have accounted for as much as 40 to 50 percent of loans outstanding at their peak in the late 1990s (Lardy 1998; BIS 1999) . Since then, the Chinese government has taken several major steps to recapitalize its banks and reduce NPLs. First, it has focused on repairing banks' balance sheets, but has also recognized the importance of strengthening corporate governance, improving risk management, building up regulatory capacities, fostering a credit culture, and liberalizing markets. The question of how bank restructuring efforts on this scale will be funded is obviously of great interest.
This paper sheds light on the potential cost of bank restructuring in China, how it will be funded-and who will foot the bill. There has been little research so far to understand these issues systematically. This paper attempts to ªll this gap. Section 2 lays out a framework to suggest that there are three possible groups of players who may foot the bill: bank shareholders, bank customers, and taxpayers. We also discuss relevant experiences from elsewhere in the world, and argue that predetermined and transparent institutional arrangements for apportioning the cost of ªnancial restructuring work best over the long term. Section 3 reviews some of the recent measures taken by the Chinese government to repair bank balance sheets, including how they were funded and the probable amounts involved. Section 4 discusses some of the short-and long-term implications of how Chinese authorities have apportioned losses among the parties involved. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper with a few brief remarks.
We reach three main conclusions in this paper. First, since the late 1990s the Chinese government has made substantial efforts to face up to the costly and politically difªcult challenges of cleaning up bank balance sheets, which, in our view, has enhanced the credibility of the overall economic restructuring process in China.
Second, the ªnancing arrangements for China's bank restructuring have been quite elaborate. Taxpayers, shareholders, and bank customers have all paid for the restructuring bill, with the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the People's Bank of China (PBC) splitting some 85 percent between them. Foreign banks and other foreign investors also have helped foot the bill-and in so doing have become an emerging force in the Chinese banking sector.
Third, the speciªc ways in which the restructuring task has been funded and losses apportioned may have implications for the prospects for the Chinese banking sector. We believe that, as the restructuring process deepens, a more transparent and rulebased framework for assigning ªnancing responsibilities will be necessary in order to contain moral hazard, improve corporate governance, strengthen central bank credibility, and further develop domestic capital markets.
Sharing the bank restructuring bill
How will the expected large ªnancial losses in the Chinese banking system ultimately be recognized and paid for? Experiences from elsewhere in the world suggest that in general, three possible groups of players can end up paying the bill for bank restructuring: existing and new bank shareholders, bank customers, and taxpayers.
Existing bank shareholders should normally absorb the ªrst loss. In China, the largest banks are state-owned, so that the government may end up absorbing a portion of the losses. Sometimes, outside investors or new shareholders are willing to pay for a portion of restructuring costs because of a troubled bank's franchise value. Bank customers, meaning borrowers and depositors, also share the costs through a relatively wide net interest margin. The government (and ultimately the taxpayer) contributes its share when public funds are injected into the banking sector. This can take a number of forms: (1) direct budget outlays funded by government debt as well as bank operating earnings and tax credits; (2) debt issued by public agencies with full state backing (contingent liabilities); and (3) ªnancing by quasi-public agencies without explicit government guarantee.
Depending on the purposes, there could be a number of alternative approaches to gauging the potential costs of restructuring bank balance sheets. At the one end, a broad approach is to include resources needed to restore the balance sheets to a reasonably healthy state. At the other end, a narrower measure would involve only the realized losses. In between, there could be various ways of deªning the costs of bank restructuring. In this paper, we deªne the "bank restructuring bill" as the costs that have been incurred to clean up the bank balance sheets, whether the involved resources have been recovered or not. It includes, but is not limited to, realized losses.
Old and new bank shareholders
It is useful to distinguish between existing and new bank shareholders. Ideally, existing shareholders' capital should be extinguished ªrst to cover losses. In principle, existing equity shareholders should absorb the loss until their capital is fully written off, before any funding from deposit insurance schemes or the treasury is deployed. If bank losses exceed shareholders' equity, but shareholders are allowed to retain a non-trivial claim on the insolvent bank, moral hazard may become an issue.
Sometimes, investors or new shareholders will pay part of a troubled bank's recapitalization bill. They are willing to invest in an insolvent bank, either through a merger or acquisition or simply by taking an equity stake, at a price above the undercapitalized bank's net asset value. These parties are willing to invest in a troubled bank because they recognize its potential franchise value or because regulatory and other costs associated with market entry are prohibitively high. New shareholders can be domestic or foreign banks, non-bank investors, or government agencies (Hawkins and Turner 1999) . These investors may help increase ownership diversiªcation and strengthen corporate governance of the banks under restructuring. However, when the government itself becomes the only shareholder of a rescued non-state-owned bank (say, through nationalization), the issues of future exit and (re)privatization must be addressed.
International experience varies, and the outcomes have been mixed on this score. Equity of existing shareholders was fully wiped out in the early 1990s during the banking crises in the United States and Norway, and in the late 1990s in Indonesia in the wake of the Asian crisis. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation adopted the purchase-and-assumption approach, whereby the purchaser bank took over the assets and liabilities of the failed bank through a bidding process, after shareholder equity was eliminated. However, in Japan, Korea, and Sweden equity of existing shareholders of insolvent banks were, in some cases, partially written down but not eliminated, even as public capital was injected into the failed banks. In both Korea and Thailand, foreign and local banks or non-bank investors were allowed to buy equity in some troubled domestic ªnancial institutions, as in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.
Bank customers
The second group of agents who may help pay (directly or indirectly) the bill are bank customers, meaning borrowers and depositors. 2 Bank customers usually bear a portion of bank restructuring costs through interest margins earned by banks: speciªcally, by paying interest spreads above competitively determined market levels, both borrowers and depositors contribute to bank operating proªts that over time help rebuild bank balance sheets. In addition, captive or underdeveloped capital markets hamper competition to banks by limiting disintermediation, in which borrowers can bypass banks and directly tap the capital and money markets for ªnancing. This is a ºow approach to recapitalizing troubled banks and often requires regulatory forbearance and accompanies tax incentives.
If, however, the initial capital deªciency is large, it may take many years before banks can be nursed back to health via a ºow approach. Following the Asian crisis of 1997, the Thai authorities granted regulatory forbearance to qualiªed Thai banks so that they could continue operating and generate net cash ºows. In China, undercapitalized banks have been earning a spread between the ofªcial one-year time deposit rate and one-year working capital loan rate of 300 basis points, above the levels likely to be seen in a more deregulated environment. Alternatively, the Chinese government was concerned about possible "adverse selection" risk, opting to regulate both deposit and loan rates before banks return to reasonable health. However, if a bank's negative equity is equal to 20 percent of assets, it could take many years to ªll the hole in its balance sheet through the accumulation of net earnings-even assuming a wide interest margin, no new NPLs, and no dividends paid.
More disturbingly, moral hazard can emerge because of forbearance. For example, the Federal Savings and Loan Bank Board in the United States allowed many undercapitalized savings and loans to continue operating for quite some time and meanwhile excessive risk-taking by some weak thrifts aggravated their problems further (White 1991) . Also, the United States Federal Reserve was thought to have pursued expansionary monetary policy in the early 1990s in order to steepen the yield curve, thereby widening net interest margins for banks. Some observers felt this policy sent a signal that big banks making common lending errors such as excessively risky loan booking would be made whole by macroeconomic policy.
Taxpayers
Three general arguments have been put forward to support the use of public funds to bail out troubled banks. First, if the troubled banks are state-owned, the government has an obligation to repair its balance sheets or at least fund its exit from the market. In China, the big four commercial banks have been solely state-owned until the recent foreign equity participation in them and their subsequent listing on stock markets (Table 1) . 3 Note that these four banks account for more than half of the total assets of the Chinese banking sector. Third, with or without a deposit insurance scheme, imposing big losses on a large number of small depositors can lead to more costly systemic risks and even political crises. Because bank deposits represent some 80 percent of Chinese households' ªnancial wealth, it is understandable that the government would be willing to intervene by injecting public money into the banking system.
Indeed, on all of these three grounds, the Chinese government may ªnd it necessary and desirable to use taxpayers' money to fund bank restructuring. These considerations might have outweighed the legitimate concerns of the Chinese policymakers over moral hazard, which can be dealt with through complementary reforms and a more transparent process of loss allocation.
Typically, there are three general modes of public funding to restore the health of the banking system. Their relative merits depend on the underlying condition of the banking system, as well as the initial endowments of local institutional arrangements and the market environment.
One is direct budgetary outlays ªnanced by taxes or government debt. Such outlays allow for transparency and accountability, and are consistent with best practice in both corporate governance and capital market development. However, approval for these outlays usually has to take place through a formal and sometimes drawn out legislative process, often with the result that the restructuring process can be substantially delayed-especially when consensus cannot be reached.
Another mode of public funding is NPL resolution and bank recapitalization through debt issued by quasi-government agencies, but with full-faith government Experiences elsewhere in Asia illustrate the various ways taxpayers' money can be used in bank restructuring. In Japan, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) provided liquidity support, secured lending to the stretched deposit insurance scheme, and even injected some risk capital into failed banks in the late 1990s (Nakaso 2001) . However, except for some unresolved minor losses associated with the BoJ's risk capital provision, Japanese government bonds and guarantees mainly ªnanced the injection of public funds into the banking system. During the Asian crisis, the Bank of Korea (BoK) provided signiªcant liquidity support to the ªnancial system, as well as some limited ªnancing to the Korea Asset Management Corporation (Fung et al. 2004 ). However, such BoK exposures were usually covered with full-faith government guarantees. In addition, the Korean government directly injected much of the public resources into the ªnancial system through funds raised by treasury bonds or ofªcially guaranteed debt issued by other quasi-public agencies.
In the same crisis, Bank Indonesia (BI) suffered heavy losses because of its massive liquidity support to many local banks, most of which subsequently failed. BI underwent prolonged negotiations with the ªnance ministry over partial settlement of such losses. The Bank of Thailand (BoT) also incurred signiªcant losses in the Asian crisis from guaranteeing creditors and protecting depositors of failed ªnancial institutions through its wholly owned subsidiary Financial Institutions Development Fund (Fung et al. 2004) . Eight years later, protracted and complicated discussions between the BoT and the Thailand ªscal authorities-and the partial funding by the Thailand government-still have not fully resolved the central bank loss.
Toward an institutional framework
A policy question therefore arises as to how the costs of ªnancial restructuring should be apportioned. The major challenge here is striking the delicate balance among (1) safeguarding systemic ªnancial stability; (2) expediting the much-needed restructuring process; and (3) preventing or containing future moral hazard (Hawkins and Turner 1999; White 2004 ). In our view, a well-deªned institutional framework for the cost-sharing process tends to work best for strengthening the banking system over the longer term, for at least the following three reasons (Crockett 1998 ):
• Transparency. A well-deªned institutional framework for cost sharing enhances transparency and disclosure, and promotes good corporate governance. In particular, transparency ensures the accountability of all players in the banking system, including regulatory authorities, bank shareholders, customers, and the banks themselves. Moreover, sufªcient and upfront ªnancial commitments can help to minimize costs of bank restructuring by instilling conªdence in the process.
• Accountability. Pre-determined rules deªne the obligations of all parties involved and discourage shirking of responsibility, thereby reducing the potential for moral hazard such as the expectation of bailouts in the future. Indeed, ambiguity of rules regarding apportionment of losses often may give rise to moral hazard and encourage accumulation of past bad debts, leading to even more new NPLs (Tang 2005 ).
• Efªciency. Clear and ex ante loss-sharing frameworks are more efªcient, because they reduce the need for repeated and often protracted ad hoc negotiations, avoid inefªcient case-by-case legislative processes, and enhance cooperation among different agencies and players in the banking system. Moreover, rule-based ªnancing arrangements tend to be more compatible with and conducive to the development of capital markets. 
Recent bank restructuring steps in China
In practice, how the costs associated with China's ªnancial restructuring are to be apportioned among bank shareholders, customers, and taxpayers depends in part on the country's institutional realities, and the underlying condition of its ªnancial system. Since the late 1990s, the Chinese government has taken a number of signiªcant measures to repair bank balance sheets, with a cumulative headline restructuring cost possibly as high as 22 percent of the newly revised 2005 GDP. restructuring efforts were initially concentrated on the big four banks, which account for more than half of China's banking sector (Table 1) , but now extend to the rest of the sector and even the securities ªrms industry. This section summarizes the principle measures taken by Chinese authorities since 1998 to strengthen bank balance sheets.
Issuance of RMB 270 billion in special government bonds in 1998
In August 1998, the Chinese government issued bonds to recapitulate the big four banks. The People's Bank of China (PBC) ªrst lowered the statutory reserve requirement ratio for the banking sector as a whole from 13 percent to 9 percent, the MoF then issued RMB 270 billion (US$ 33 billion) 6 in special government bonds. The big four state-owned banks used the liquidity freed up by the lowering of the reserve ratio to purchase the bonds. The government then injected all the bond proceeds as equity into the big four banks (Mo 1999) , with the consequence that the capital base of the big four banks more than doubled. As the initial sole owner of the big four banks, the MoF thus met the capital call from these banks and explicitly burdened future taxpayers to fund a capital injection.
The ªrst round of NPL transfers totaling RMB 1.4 trillion in 1999
In 1999, the Chinese government carved out RMB 1.4 trillion (US$ 173 billion, or 20 percent of the total loan balance at that time) in NPLs from the big four banks at par value and transferred them over to four state-owned asset management companies (AMCs). In return, the AMCs issued bonds to the four banks and assumed some of their liabilities to the PBC. Effectively, this batch of NPL acquisition was ªnanced 55 percent by AMC bonds and 45 percent by PBC credit. This move was a double act of NPL removal and bank recapitalization (Ma and Fung 2002) .
However, because of the "constructive ambiguity" of the MoF toward its backing of these bonds, the value of the bonds issued by the AMCs was initially called into question. Indeed, there may still be the risk that the big four banks swapped their own NPLs for AMC bonds with uncertain prospects of timely debt service. Disclosure is such that it is not clear if the AMCs have made regular interest payments to the big four banks on their bonds, or to the PBC on the liabilities assumed by the purchasing AMCs. So far, the four AMCs have resolved about half of the acquired NPLs, with a 20 percent cash recovery rate. This would not sufªce, on a collective basis, to cover the interest payments on their bonds issued and PBC loans assumed so far.
Therefore, at least for a period, the effective recapitalization of the big four banks might not be as large as the headline NPL removal would suggest, while the PBC's balance sheet has clearly suffered. This is a case of recapitalizing banks via injections by the central bank and other public agencies (AMCs) without an explicit government guarantee. 
US$ 60 billion in capital injections out of foreign reserves since 2003
In exchange for equity, the PBC has injected US$ 60 billion capital out of its foreign reserves into three of the big four banks since late 2003. To bypass the Chinese central bank law that prohibits the PBC from owning any commercial banks, a stateowned investment vehicle called the Central Huijin Investment Corporation Limited (Huijin) was set up in 2003 to receive funding from the PBC, and invest the money into the three commercial banks' equity. Thus far, Huijin has injected US$ 22.5 billion each into China Construction Bank (CCB) and Bank of China (BoC) and US$ 15 billion into Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Presumably, such equity investments form the risk capital of the restructured banks, which would mean that Huijin, as the equity investment arm of the PBC, has become the largest ªnancial holding company in China. Because funding at the margin can be taken to be interest-bearing PBC bills, this is a case of ªnancing through debts issued by public agencies without full-faith state backing. 
Loss recognition by existing bank shareholders
Until recently, most Chinese banks were wholly state-owned. As the initial sole owner of the big four banks, the MoF opted to recognize loss of all of its equity in CCB and BoC (some RMB 320 billion) as the counterpart of the loan loss write-offs and increases in provisions. Thus, through Huijin, the PBC took over these two recapitalized banks and became their controlling shareholder. In this case, the original bank shareholders, that is, China's taxpayers, absorbed the loss. In contrast, in the case of ICBC, the MoF wrote down only one-third of its original RMB 170 billion equity stake, and retained the rest of its equity claims in order to share a 50/50 control of the restructured ICBC with Huijin. However, a massive RMB 246 billion of ICBC's remaining loan losses has been parked under a joint MoF/ICBC special purpose "receivable" account at ICBC that yields interest to ICBC, and is reportedly funded by future dividends (supposedly accruing to the MoF as a 50 percent equity owner) and possibly additional tax credits. 9 Therefore, this is a real mixed bag: shareholders and therefore taxpayers recognize some of the loss instantly and some in installments. Moreover, the latter arrangement smacks of regulatory forbearance granted by authorities to themselves. Whether the restructuring takes the form of receivables or outright write-off and provision of risk capital, taxpayers will eventually have to pick up the tab.
Additional NPL transfers totaling RMB 780 billion since 2004
Since 2004, the PBC's balance sheet has been tapped on two occasions to fund the transfers of the doubtful loans at the recapitalized CCB, BoC, and ICBC onto the books of the AMCs. The total book value of loans transferred has amounted to some RMB 780 billion (US$ 96 billion). In 2004, the PBC bought the ªrst batch of RMB 320 billion in doubtful loans from CCB and BoC (as well as Bank of Communications; see subsequent paragraphs) for half of their book value and then auctioned them to the AMCs for 30 to 40 cents on the dollar. 10 Presumably, the MoF wrote off its equity in CCB and BoC as well as gave up the 2003-04 net proªts of the CCB and BoC to help fund the 50 percent loss of the RMB 320 billion NPL transfer as well as to raise provisions. In 2005, the PBC bought a second batch of RMB 460 billion in doubtful loans from ICBC at par value and auctioned them to the AMCs for an average of 26 cents on the dollar.
In these two NPL transactions, the PBC appeared to have made an outright loss from the differences between the acquisition and auction prices of the doubtful loans involved of nearly RMB 400 billion (US$ 50 billion)-or some 20 times the PBC's own reported capital. Furthermore, the PBC balance sheet has additional exposure to the AMCs because it again provided the credit to ªnance their two NPL In essence, the PBC has been recapitalized to ªnance bank recapitalization, all without a government guarantee, at least on the public record.
Other domestic recapitalization moves
In June 2004, the Bank of Communications, the ªfth largest bank in China, was recapitalized to the tune of RMB 35 billion (US$ 4 billion), after a large portion of its NPLs were purchased by the PBC at 50 percent of the book value (see the previous discussion). The MoF and other existing bank shareholders contributed new capital of RMB 7 billion; Huijin invested RMB 3 billion (reportedly funded by interestbearing PBC bills); the National Social Security Fund chipped in RMB 10 billion in return for an equity stake; and HSBC paid RMB 15 billion for a 19.9 percent stake, a premium of some 40 percent to the valuation for the MoF and Huijin equity investment (see Table 2 ). This recapitalization exercise was a "hybrid" one ªnanced by funds from the government and public agencies, existing shareholders, as well as domestic and foreign investors.
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Who Pays China's Bank Restructuring Bill?
11 The credit risk to the PBC loans in this case would be marginally smaller than in the 1999 case, given that this time, the AMCs purchased the NPLs at auctioned prices rather than book value. Nevertheless, the PBC balance sheet remains exposed to the same debtors (AMCs) which may ªnd it a huge challenge to service their 1999 loans without special state support. 
Foreign equity participation
Foreign investors are footing China's bank restructuring bill to the extent that they are paying a premium for equity stakes in Chinese banks. The ofªcial policy has been to encourage foreign strategic investors to become shareholders of Chinese banks and subsequently to list those banks on stock markets. The purpose of this strategy is not just to attract capital, but also to diversify ownership, improve corporate governance, promote a credit culture, enhance disclosure, and facilitate transfers of expertise. 12 Moreover, private or public foreign equity participation provides an exit strategy for the state to recoup its equity investment in recapitalized banksthrough sales of equity stakes to foreign investors.
Foreign capital committed to the Chinese banking sector, in the form of either direct or portfolio investment, has been considerable, and the inºow has accelerated since 2002 (Table 2 Listing on overseas stock markets has also been intended as one way for the Chinese government to push through bank restructuring without being held hostage to the vagaries of local stock markets, which have been undergoing overhaul lately.
13 Securities Times, 17 December 2005.
14 We assume that foreign investors foot the bill only to the extent that they pay a premium for their equity stakes in Chinese banks. For instance, HSBC paid a 40 percent premium to take a 19.9 percent stake in Bank of Communications, which was listed at an IPO price of 1.54 times the book value. BoA paid 1.15 times book in its investment in CCB, which was later listed at an IPO price of 1.96 times book. RBS pays 1.17 times book value to take 9.6 percent of the BoC which was listed at an IPO price of more than 2 times book, whereas a Goldman Sacks-led consortium paid 1.22 times book. Newbridge Capital paid a price of 2.38 times book to be the largest shareholder in Shenzhen Development Bank.
Cleaning up the rural credit cooperatives and city commercial banks
As the pace of bank restructuring quickened, Chinese policymakers turned their attention to the other two segments of the banking sector: the second-tier city commercial banks and the 34,000 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs). In both the RCC and city commercial bank sectors, local taxpayers, the PBC, and shareholders (existing and new) have footed the bill. The total bill for restructuring the balance sheets of these two sectors could well have exceeded RMB 500 billion by late 2005.
To date, the PBC has issued and handed over at least RMB 168 billion of its special interest-bearing bills to the RCCs to cover half of their negative equity arising from the recognition of their loan losses-apparently without receiving equity stakes in return. Local governments (through their budgetary accounts or their investment arms) as well as existing and new shareholders have made up the remainder of the clean-up bill. Financing from the PBC puts the total estimated restructuring cost of the RCCs at a minimum of RMB 336 billion (US$ 42 billion)-and that just to keep the sector's net worth positive. In addition, to lift the capital adequacy of the RCC sector toward international standards, both existing and new RCC shareholders had reportedly injected capital of RMB 104 billion for the sector as a whole by mid 2005.
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Separately, the clean-up of the city commercial bank sector has been funded mainly by a mixture of equity dilutions of existing shareholdings and contributions from local ªscal authorities or their investment arms, who have coughed up at least RMB 36 billion (US$ 5 billion) thus far. 16 Foreign investors may have also shared the bill by paying a premium to acquire equity stakes in a number of Chinese city commercial banks (Table 2) .
The changing role of Chinese bank customers
Bank customers have been in effect contributing to the restructuring bill as well. While liberalization has led to greater interest rate ºexibility in China, the authorities have continued setting benchmark deposit rate ceilings and minimum lending rates to maintain interest spreads of some 300 basis points. Although such spreads may not be the widest in the world, they could shrink considerably if market forces played a more prominent role. In addition, the underdevelopment of China's money and capital markets means that larger depositors cannot seek higher returns on other instruments such as mutual funds, and that sound enterprises cannot lower Source: The PBC Quarterly Statistical Bulletin.
17 The situation, however, has been changing since May 2005 when the short-term corporate Commercial Paper (CP) was ªrst introduced in the interbank market. It has been priced at less than 3 percent, compared to the prevailing ofªcial one-year best lending rate of more than 5 percent. To partially compensate the commercial banks, the regulators have limited the principal CP underwriters mainly to these banks so that they can earn as much as 40 basis points of the CP underwriting fees and charge primary rates at 60 basis points above the prevailing yields in the secondary market.
par with or even below those on MoF bonds of similar maturities, with little transparency about the pricing mechanism for the subordinated bonds placed publicly or privately, or the distribution of holdings. Taxpayers get little protection from such window dressing (Fukao 2002) .
Implications
In order to gauge the total cost of bank restructuring in China, we have taken into account the ªnancial resources incurred in recognizing past losses as well as those used for beeªng up the banking sector's capital base to the required levels. Summing up in the ªnancial costs of these restructuring exercises in a simplistic and ad hoc manner, the estimated payments toward China's bank restructuring bill to date have approached nearly RMB 4 trillion (US$ 500 billion)-or 22 percent of the revised 2005 GDP (see Appendix 1). This ªgure is likely to be an underestimate. Indeed, the headline cost could eventually exceed RMB 5 trillion (US$ 620 billion), or more than 28 percent of GDP, given that the most troubled of the big four state banks has yet to be restructured, the three policy banks will have to be recapitalized, and more RCCs and city commercial banks still need to be cleaned up.
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The ªnancing arrangements for China's bank restructuring have been complex and wide-ranging. They have included outright MoF bonds, tapping the PBC balance sheet, recent and promised future ºows of tax credits and operating earnings, excessive interest margins shouldered by bank customers, capital call on existing shareholders, and premiums associated with equity investment by domestic and foreign investors. Thus, taxpayers, shareholders, and bank customers have all shared the restructuring bill. The MoF and PBC together have taken care of 85 percent of the bill, with the rest of the tab being picked up by bank shareholders, investors, and customers. Therefore, the consolidated public sector is bearing the lion's share of the overall bill.
Although one may debate about the relative merits of various ways of funding and apportioning bank losses and the probable size of the restructuring bill, there is little doubt that the Chinese authorities have move expeditiously in meeting the challenges to the banking system. Nevertheless, the Chinese experience raises a number 
Balance sheet impact
The short-term impact of these restructuring exercises on the balance sheet of the Chinese banking sector has been marked (Table 1) . Following injections of public and private funds, the balance sheets of most Chinese banks are now in far better shape, with lower NPL levels, enhanced provisions, and a stronger capital base across the sector (Moody's 2005a (Moody's , 2005b Garcia-Herrero, Gavila, and Santabarbara 2005) . For instance, the recorded aggregate equity capital of China's RCC sector reportedly swung from a negative 10 percent at end-2002 to almost positive 6 percent by June 2005. Similarly, the city commercial bank sector saw its average capital adequacy ratio jump to 5 percent at the end of 2005 from less than 1.5 percent just one year ago. 21 The recent credit rating upgrades by several international rating agencies of several Chinese banks and the success of their recent IPOs have been an endorsement of such restructuring efforts.
Nevertheless, it is far from clear to what degree recapitalization measures have strengthened the banking system. The ambiguous status of the AMC bonds was particularly troubling until more recently as was the incestuous interbank swaps of subordinated debt. Moreover, some in the media claim that public capital taken from foreign reserves should be principal-guaranteed. Such media opinions would raise doubts about whether such equity should be treated as core risk capital absorbing real shocks, or simply as a vase borrowed for decoration only. If such equity capital investments by the state are counted as forming genuine core risk capital at all, they should, by deªnition, be subject to downside as well as upside risks.
There have also been some concerns that, absent other complementary reforms, such injections of public ªnancial resources into the banking sector might give rise to moral hazard, which, in turn, would lead to new NPLs in the system and repeated state bailouts. Although the risk of moral hazard clearly exists and must be taken seriously, our view is that the best approach is not to play down but to face up to the potential size of the bank restructuring bill. In fact, by not recognizing past loan losses and recapitalization needs fully, the risk of moral hazard is likely accentuated, not mitigated. 
Headline restructuring costs
The ªnal bank restructuring bill may differ from the simple headline number, in part because of the following two factors: (1) the ongoing capital injection, NPL transfers, and use of tax credits and bank earnings ºows to strengthen bank balance sheets; and (2) possible gains/losses on new equity investment by the government in the restructured banks. Therefore, the size of the eventual total bill could remain uncertain for an extended period.
The ªrst factor is straightforward, mainly because the segments of China's banking sector have not been fully restructured. For example, in the case of future ªnancial ºows to fund bank restructuring, the state reportedly has promised ICBC and city commercial banks additional tax credits and the use of future retained earnings to rebuild their balance sheets over the next several years.
The realized gains or losses from Huijin's equity investment and the premium paid by new shareholders may inºuence not only the headline bill, but also how it is apportioned. It is therefore interesting to consider the valuation effects of subsequent private and public equity transactions. For instance, Bank of America (BoA) and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) bought 14 and 16 percent, respectively, of Huijin's stakes in CCB and BoC. We estimate that relative to the original valuation of the initial investment in 2003, Huijin realized a capital gain of nearly RMB 10 billion (US$ 1.2 billion) from selling down its CCB and BoC stakes in these two private equity deals (Table 2 and Appendix 2).
However, this headline realized capital gain for Huijin could be partially offset by the appreciation of the renminbi since the July 2005 policy change. Moreover, one needs to take into account the rest of the deal packages-including options, lockups, or promises of net asset values above the acquisition prices (CCB 2005; BoC 2006 ). In the case of the CCB private equity deal, BoA received a call option to increase its CCB stake up to 19.9 percent, with an expiration date in 2011 and an elaborate strike price structure. The value of such a call option could be signiªcant relative to the premium of 1.15 times the net asset value paid by BoA. By contrast, in the BoC private equity transaction, RBS did not receive call options, but has secured some downside protection for a limited period. Thus, the gains or losses related to Huijin's equity investment may not be known until these options expire, or are eliminated and exercised.
Impact on monetary and exchange-rate policy
Chinese policymakers have tried hard to contain possible undesired interferences and spillovers between these large-scale bank restructuring exercises on the one hand and monetary and exchange rate policy objectives on the other. Using the central bank balance sheet to fund a big part of bank restructuring has indeed posed some challenges to monetary policy. To avoid injecting excessive liquidity into the banking system within a relatively short period, for example, the PBC has imposed requirements that the special PBC bills issued to the RCCs and to fund the NPL transactions during 2004-05 will not be transferable or used as collateral for a minimum period of two to three years. In addition, to cope with the intensiªed appreciation pressure on the renminbi since 2003, the three recapitalized banks are not allowed to convert the injected foreign currency-denominated capital into renminbi for a "vesting period" of about three years. Therefore, the new bank capital might ºuctuate in renminbi terms along with a more ºexible exchange rate.
Two questions arise in relation to exchange-rate risks. First, what might the currency composition of bank capital look like? It likely differs from one bank to another. Whereas the core equity capital of ICBC is likely to be denominated half in local currency and half in US$, almost the entire tier-1 capital of BoC and CCB might be denominated in a currency other than renminbi. Indeed, while BoC's core capital was a mix of US$ and gold (BoC 2006), CCB's would be mostly US$-denominated. This in turns begs the question of the optimal relation between the currency compositions of a bank's equity and asset (Fukao 1991 
Longer-term implications
There are at least four longer-term issues arising from the recent funding practices of China's bank restructuring. First, until the well-deªned rules governing loss apportionment emerge and Huijin becomes more transparent, Chinese taxpayers may ªnd the ªnancing arrangements a bit murky. Lack of both ex ante and ex post transparency about the ªnancing of bank restructuring is not conducive to good corporate governance and could lead to moral hazard. To address both the "stock" and "ºow" issues facing the Chinese banking sector, accountability is key-and that needs to start with a set of well-deªned rules stipulating ªnancing responsibilities. Similarly, accountability would inºuence the average level of loss given default in the Chinese banking sector.
Second, some of the ways to fund bank restructuring in China may not be conducive to debt market development. Keeping bank interest margins high could have been one reason for the underdevelopment of China's corporate bond and money markets. More developed debt markets, although possibly compressing bank interest margins for a while, would beneªt the banking sector and economy as a whole over the long term. This is because a deeper and broader capital market would encourage banks to rely less on balance sheet expansion and more on fee-income producing activities and enhance the resilience of the ªnancial system (Gyntelberg, Ma, and Remolona 2005) . In addition, fragmented and often non-tradable debt issued by multiple agencies in ªnancing the bank restructuring process tends to depress debt market liquidity generally (McCauley 2003) . Unifying different issues by various agencies instead would help improve secondary market liquidity and promote bond market development.
Third, speciªc concerns have also arisen about the heavy use of the central bank balance sheet to fund bank restructuring in China (Ma and Fung 2002) . Although taxpayers have footed some 85 percent of China's restructuring bill, many conventional measures of government debt levels in China have not risen as much. This is possible, in our view, mainly because of the unusual expansion of the central bank balance sheet as well as other unbacked public agency IOUs. Between end-2001 and end-2005 , the size of the PBC's balance sheet more than doubled-with the estimated central bank ªnancing of the country's bank restructuring now representing at least 15 percent of the entire balance sheet.
In essence, the PBC is being decapitalized to the beneªt of the banks. Excessive use of the central bank to fund such quasi-ªscal burdens could damage its balance sheet. This could be the result of a mismatch between liquid liabilities and illiquid assets or the loss of budgetary autonomy (in the event that the central bank's cash ºows become negative), or both. Moreover, such problems could hinder the longterm institutional development of the central bank in several respects.
For example, given the potential conºict of interest between ªnancing needs and monetary objectives, the credibility of a central bank's monetary policy could be compromised. Additionally, market conªdence in the capacity of a central bank to act as a lender of last resort could be eroded over time. Also, a large overhang of illiquid and often non-negotiable assets on the balance sheet of the central bank may retard the development of money and bond markets, limit the choices of monetary policy instruments, and weaken transmission of monetary policy.
Finally, the recent pickup in foreign equity participation in the Chinese banks raises the question of how open its domestic banking market is and how this will affect the sector's outlook. Even though the process of WTO-agreed access for foreign banks to the domestic market is proceeding on time, the shift to domestic currency lending in China by major international banks has hardly altered their China positions to date. Figure 1 suggests that access by foreign banks to local renminbi banking business has been quite limited relative to international cross-border U.S. dollar business. Figure 2 also shows that the overall share of foreign banks in China's banking market (broadly deªned) has been low. In this light, the Chinese domestic banking market arguably remains one of the most closed major emerging banking markets in the world.
On the other hand, despite the ofªcial ceilings on foreign ownership, substantial FDI and portfolio investment in domestic banks suggest that the Chinese banking sector is opening up. To date, FDI has reached some 15 percent of the domestic banking sector's capital base. Although the prevailing ofªcial ceilings on foreign ownership in a Chinese bank are 20 percent for a single foreign investor and 25 percent for all foreign investors combined, these restrictions appear to apply only to non-listed banks. approached 30 percent, and those of CCB and BoC could have already exceeded 25 percent. This trend of increased foreign equity participation could have an important bearing on the landscape of China's banking market over the longer term. In a way, the Chinese banking sector might not be as closed as other measures suggest.
Concluding remarks
Since 1998, the Chinese government has stepped up the pace of cleaning up the balance sheet of the banking sector, confronting the sizable restructuring task that may have cost as much as 22 percent of GDP to date. Funding arrangements have been elaborate, with bank shareholders, bank customers, and taxpayers all having shared China's overall ªnancial restructuring cost. Taxpayers have footed most of the bill, often with little explicit recognition of this fact in ofªcial government debt totals. A signiªcant portion of the funding burden could have fallen on the PBC, as seigniorage has been capitalized through the rising amounts of interest-bearing PBC bills and other liabilities.
Although efforts to rebuild banks' balance sheets are not a panacea for all the challenges faced by the Chinese banking sector, lingering concerns over moral hazard are no excuse to shun these important measures. We argue, therefore, for a more transparent framework to apportion ªnancing responsibilities among the parties concerned, because well-deªned rules of loss allocation restrain moral hazard and promote both accountability and market development. The recent increased FDI in the Chinese banking sector has not only helped fund the restructuring task, but may also alter the sector's landscape over the longer term-if the Chinese manufacturing sector over the past three decades is anything to go by. the two banks. These new injections of ªnancial resources should be regarded as additional equity investment on top of the Huijin capital injections. On these assumptions, the realized capital gain to the initial Huijin investment from the two private equity deals is estimated at US$ 1.2 billion, or nearly RMB 10 billion.
The initial equity structure of BoC before taking on foreign strategic investors was quite simple. Huijin gained 100 percent control of BoC after investing US$ 22.5 billion in the bank at end-2003. The transaction was that RBS and three other foreign investors would take a total 16.2 percent stake in the enlarged capital (in the forms of both newly issued BoC shares and old BoC shares held by Huijin) for a consideration of US$ 5.14 billion. Effectively, Huijin disposed of 6.6 percent of its old BoC shares for a price tag of US$ 1.79 billion, realizing a capital gain of up to US$ 320 million from this partial divestment, because 6.6 percent of US$ 22.5 billion would be US$ 1.485 billion. This implies a 20 percent realized return on Huijin's original investment. The other US$ 3.35 billion would accrue directly to BoC from RBS and the three other investors in return for the newly issued BoC shares amounting to 10.6 percent of the enlarged capital.
The initial CCB equity arrangement before the foreign private equity transaction is somewhat more complicated. To keep it simple, before the private equity deal was announced in mid-2005, Huijin directly controlled 85.23 percent of CCB for an initial investment of US$ 20 billion (Huijin also has equity stakes in CCB indirectly through another vehicle; and CCB has three other minority corporate shareholders). The transaction involved the 14.1 percent old CCB shares sold by Huijin to BoA and Temasek for a price tag of US$ 3.966 billion (BoA paid a price of 1.15 times book value while Temasek paid 1.19 times book). A 14.1 percent equity stake in CCB would be worth US$ 3.306 billion at the original valuation of the Huijin investment, but sold for US$ 3.966 billion, with a realized capital gain of US$ 660 million, or a 20 percent return on the initial investment through Huijin's sale of its own direct CCB stake from 85.3 percent to 71.2 percent.
